War in the Age of Drones: Do Current Norms Protect Civilians?

War in the Age of Drones: Civilian Protection and India’s Drone Warfare Challenge

“The drone is no longer just a machine. It is a doctrine, a dilemma, and a danger—especially when the sky above South Asia grows crowded.”

Drone warfare has transformed modern conflict. What began as a tool for surveillance has now become a central instrument of military strategy, raising serious ethical, legal, and humanitarian concerns—particularly for civilian populations.

India’s Dilemma: Between Innovation and Restraint

Global discussions on drone warfare often focus on the United States, Russia, or Israel. India, however, occupies a unique position. It is both a developing drone power and a geographically exposed nation, sharing some of the world’s most volatile borders with Pakistan and China.

For India, civilian protection is not a theoretical concern—it is a strategic necessity as the country accelerates the militarisation of its drone ecosystem.

From Surveillance to Strike: India’s Drone Evolution

India’s engagement with drone technology initially focused on non-combat roles.

In 2013, drones were deployed to map flood-affected regions of Uttarakhand, reaching areas inaccessible to human rescuers and aiding disaster relief operations.

Similarly, in internal security operations, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) effectively used unarmed drones to monitor Maoist-affected areas in Bastar, improving situational awareness without kinetic force.

A strategic shift became visible with Operation Sindoor (2025)—India’s retaliation following the Pahalgam terrorist incident. This operation marked the integration of drones with standoff weapons, enabling real-time precision strikes.

India Today

India is currently:

  • Procuring armed drone swarms and autonomous surveillance systems

  • Deploying loitering munitions such as Harop, capable of kamikaze-style attacks

  • Building an indigenous drone ecosystem with over 550 Indian drone companies (Drone Federation of India, 2024)

Despite this rapid expansion, India lacks a publicly available drone warfare doctrine, clear rules of engagement, civilian casualty protocols, or transparency guidelines.

The Civilian Question: What If India Strikes First?

The 2021 drone attack on Jammu Airbase signalled a new era of aerial threats. However, critical concerns arise when India itself becomes the striking party:

  • Who verifies targets in real time?

  • What safeguards ensure militant targets are not embedded in civilian areas?

  • Who is accountable if AI systems misidentify civilians?

These concerns are not hypothetical. In Myanmar, insurgent groups using improvised and 3D-printed drones have repeatedly misfired, causing civilian harm. In Gaza, AI-supported targeting systems have underestimated civilian presence, leading to significant non-combatant casualties.

India is not immune to these risks.

South Asia’s Unique Escalation Risk

Unlike the U.S. or Israel, India operates in a nuclearised and crisis-prone region. A drone strike causing civilian casualties in Pakistan-controlled territory could trigger diplomatic crises, military retaliation, or even nuclear signalling.

As one analyst notes:
“Without shared rules and restraints, drones will become crisis-makers rather than deterrent tools.”

India’s Regulatory Gap: Innovation Without Ethics

India’s Draft Civil Drone (Promotion and Regulation) Bill, 2025 introduces strict licensing, certification, and penalties—but only for civilian and commercial drones.

There is no comparable regulation governing:

  • Armed military drones

  • Automated or AI-driven targeting systems

  • Cross-border drone strikes with civilian impact

In effect, India maintains stricter rules for recreational drones than for military ones.

What India Must Do—Before It’s Too Late

India’s technological advancement has outpaced its ethical and legal safeguards. Immediate steps are required.

1. Publish a Military Drone Doctrine

Clear guidelines must define when and how drones can be deployed, particularly for preventive strikes, with explicit civilian protection standards.

2. Establish a Civilian Harm Assessment & Reporting Body

An independent military-civilian mechanism should investigate, document, and report allegations of civilian harm.

3. Negotiate South Asian Drone Norms

India, Pakistan, and China should pursue:

  • No-first-use pledges for military drones

  • Shared early-warning mechanisms

  • Hotlines for drone incidents along the LoC and LAC

4. Regulate Autonomous Lethality

Fully autonomous lethal drones should be prohibited. Mandatory human-in-the-loop verification must remain non-negotiable.

5. Export Responsibly

As India emerges as a drone exporter, strict end-use controls are essential to prevent misuse abroad.

Conclusion: Power Without Principle Is Peril

India stands at the threshold of a drone-powered security era. Yet, technological power without ethical restraint is dangerous.

If India seeks global leadership in security affairs, it must match military capability with robust legal and moral frameworks.

The sky is no longer a limit—it is a test.

References

  • Drone Federation of India. (2024). India’s growing unmanned systems ecosystem.

  • Geospatial World. (2013). Mapping the Uttarakhand floods using UAV imagery.

  • Israel Aerospace Industries. (2020). Harop loitering munition system: Technical specifications.

  • Khan, S. (2024). Drone Escalation in South Asia: Time for New Norms. Modern Diplomacy.

  • Panda, A. (2023). South Asia’s Rising Drone Threat: Escalation Risks in a Nuclearised Neighbourhood. The Diplomat.

  • Press Information Bureau. (2025). Draft Drone (Regulation) Bill 2025. Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India.

  • Schmitt, M. N., & Williams, H. (2024). Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Targeting. CNAS.

  • The Hindu. (2021). Drone attack on Jammu airbase marks a new phase in cross-border tactics.

  • Zerodha. (2022). The Rise of Drone Warfare Across India’s Borders. Zerodha Daily Brief.

 

Article written by
Saloni Rana
3rd year, NMIMS, Chandigarh