MUMBAI — Stand-up comedian Kunal Kamra has once again made headlines, this time for calling Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister Eknath Shinde a “gaddar” (traitor) in a parody song. The controversial remark has led to five separate FIRs filed against him in Maharashtra.

Kamra, known for his bold political satire and outspoken views, is no stranger to legal troubles. Over the years, he has faced several cases, particularly for his sharp criticism of public figures, judges, and institutions.

Previous Legal Battles: A Timeline

Kamra’s legal journey has been long and eventful. Let’s take a look at four key incidents where the comedian found himself at odds with the law:

1. In-Flight Middle Finger to the CJI

In 2020, Kamra posted a photo of himself on a flight, holding up two fingers with the caption:

“One of these 2 fingers is for [then] CJI Arvind Bobde… ok let me not confuse you, it’s the middle one.”

The post sparked a contempt of court petition.

2. Comparing the Judiciary to First-Class Air Travel

Kamra later tweeted about Justice DY Chandrachud (who is now the Chief Justice of India), criticizing the judge for granting bail to TV anchor Arnab Goswami in a high-profile abetment to suicide case. Kamra wrote:

“(CJI) DY Chandrachud is a flight attendant serving champagne to first class passengers while commoners don’t even know if they’ll ever be boarded or seated.”

This tweet too triggered legal proceedings for contempt.

 3. Calling the Apex Court a “Brahmin-Baniya” Affair

In another controversial comment, Kamra referred to the Supreme Court as a “Brahmin-Baniya affair”, leading to a third contempt petition.

4. Altered Image of Supreme Court with BJP Flag

Kamra also shared a digitally altered image of the Supreme Court building coloured saffron with the BJP flag hoisted above it. The move drew criticism, and a lawyer from Varanasi, Saurabh Tiwari, filed a complaint seeking an FIR for “disrespecting the national flag.”

However, the Varanasi magistrate dismissed the plea due to lack of jurisdiction. A revision petition was also rejected by the district court.

Where Do These Cases Stand Now?

All the contempt petitions filed against Kamra were eventually clubbed and heard together by the Supreme Court. Despite repeated listings (seven in total), the matters remain unresolved.

On January 5, 2023, CJI DY Chandrachud recused himself from hearing the case as Kamra had criticised one of his earlier judgments. The matter was last heard on January 23, 2023, and then adjourned. Since then, it hasn’t returned to the court’s schedule.

Kamra has consistently refused to apologise. In his defence, he said:

“My jokes can’t shake the foundations of the judiciary.”

The Bigger Picture: Freedom of Speech vs Contempt

Kunal Kamra’s case has become symbolic of the ongoing debate between freedom of speech and limits on criticism of the judiciary.

While some believe satire and dissent are essential in a democracy, others argue that public figures must act responsibly and avoid mocking constitutional institutions.

Final Word

Whether you agree with Kunal Kamra or not, one thing is clear—the conversation around free speech, dissent, and judicial accountability in India is far from over. His legal battles continue to highlight the delicate balance between expression and respect for the rule of law.

In a landmark decision, the Bar Council of India (BCI) has imposed a strict ban on lawyers advertising their services through social media, Bollywood celebrities, and influencers. This move comes after a viral Instagram reel featuring actor Rahul Bose promoting a law firm sparked outrage.

The Crackdown: What’s Prohibited?

The BCI has ruled that lawyers and law firms can no longer:

• Use Bollywood celebrities or influencers for promotions.
• Run digital ads, reels, banners, or sponsored content.
• Offer misleading legal advice by non-lawyers.
• Solicit clients through WhatsApp, social media, or digital platforms.
• Use public events for self-promotion.

Penalties for Violators

Lawyers, firms, and digital platforms that fail to comply will face:

• Immediate removal of violating ads.
• Suspension from legal practice.
• Revocation of BCI enrollment.
• Contempt proceedings before the Supreme Court.

What Triggered the Ban?

The controversy erupted when law firm DSK Legal featured Bollywood actor Rahul Bose in a promotional Instagram reel. The BCI deemed this a direct violation of Rule 36, which strictly prohibits legal advertising. The Council emphasized that the legal profession is a noble pursuit, not a business.

Legal Community Divided

While senior lawyers support the move, arguing that it preserves the dignity of the profession, younger advocates see it as outdated and restrictive in the digital era.

• “Law is about ethics, not marketing!” – Senior Lawyer, Mumbai
• “How do we compete if we can’t advertise?” – Young Advocate, Delhi

The Future of Legal Marketing in India

With the BCI banning lawyer advertising, law firms must explore alternative ways to build their reputation while staying within ethical boundaries. Many firms are now focusing on content marketing, thought leadership, and networking to gain credibility.

Additionally, this decision raises questions about digital ethics and free speech for legal professionals. Could this be the first step towards broader regulatory changes in legal marketing?

For more updates on lawyer advertising regulations in India, check out our articles on:

🔹 Understanding Rule 36: What Lawyers Can and Can’t Do
🔹 Impact of the BCI’s Ban on Young Lawyers

As the BCI bans lawyer advertising, legal professionals must adapt to new strategies while maintaining ethical standards. Stay tuned for further insights on this evolving issue.

The Road Ahead

With the BCI tightening its grip, lawyers must rethink their online presence. The debate continues—is this a much-needed ethical safeguard or a regressive move in a digital world?

One thing is certain: the BCI isn’t backing down.

The recent arrest of renowned Telugu actor Allu Arjun referred to widely as Allu Arjun’s Arrest, has brought significant attention to the legal processes of arrest, detention, and custody in India. This incident, stemming from a tragic event during the premiere of his film Pushpa 2: The Rule, offers a lens through which to understand these legal procedures, the applicable laws, and the implications of India’s newly reformed criminal justice system.

Background of the Incident

On December 4, 2024, during the premiere of “Pushpa 2: The Rule” at Sandhya Theatre in Hyderabad, a stampede occurred following Allu Arjun’s surprise appearance. The unexpected surge of fans led to the unfortunate death of a 35-year-old woman named Revathi and critical injuries to her 8-year-old son, Sri Teja. In the aftermath, the victim’s husband filed a complaint under Section 105, 118(1) read with 3(5) of BNS against Allu Arjun, his security team, and the theatre management, alleging negligence for failing to inform the police about the actor’s attendance, which could have facilitated better crowd control.

Legal Framework Governing Arrest, Detention, and Custody

The procedures for arrest, detention, and custody in India are primarily governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). However, with the recent legislative reforms, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) has replaced the CrPC, introducing updated provisions to modernise the criminal justice system.

Arrest Procedures

An arrest involves taking a person into legal custody based on allegations of committing an offence. Under Section 35 of the BNSS, the police are empowered to arrest individuals without a warrant in cognisable offences of serious crimes where immediate action is necessary. In this case, Allu Arjun was arrested on charges under section 105 of BNS culpable homicide not amounting to murder, a serious offence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which has replaced the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Detention and Custody

Post-arrest, the individual is placed in detention, which refers to the period the accused spends in police custody before being presented to a magistrate. Section 58 of the BNSS mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours, excluding travel time. Allu Arjun was presented before a local court, which initially remanded him to 14 days in judicial custody. However, the Telangana High Court granted him interim bail within hours, though he spent the night in jail due to administrative delays. Allu Arjun has also approached the Telangana High Court for quashing of the FIR against him. 

Relevant Legal Provisions

1. Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder: Under Section 105 of the BNS, culpable homicide is defined as causing death to cause death or to cause bodily injury likely to cause death. In this scenario, the charges suggest that the negligence attributed to Allu Arjun and others led to the fatal stampede.
2. Section 118 (1) of the BNS: This section applies when a person intentionally causes harm to another using dangerous tools, weapons, or methods. In the context of the recent incident at the theatre, the FIR was registered under this section as physical injuries and harm occurred due to the alleged negligence of the management in controlling the crowd, which created a hazardous environment.

Implications of the New Criminal Justice System

The recent reforms in India’s criminal justice system, marked by the introduction of the BNS, BNSS, and BSA, aim to decolonize and modernize the legal framework. These changes focus on delivering justice rather than mere punishment, with an emphasis on protecting individual rights and ensuring fair trials.

Key Reforms Impacting Arrest and Detention

• Time-Bound Investigations: The BNSS stipulates strict timelines for investigations, especially in cases involving serious offences, to prevent prolonged detention without trial.
• Mandatory Forensic Evidence: For serious crimes, the presence of forensic experts at crime scenes is now mandatory, ensuring that evidence collection is scientific and reduces the chances of wrongful arrests.
• Digital Evidence Recognition: The BSA acknowledges digital records as admissible evidence, reflecting technological advancements and the need for contemporary evidence standards.

Public Reaction and Legal Scrutiny

Allu Arjun’s arrest has sparked widespread public and media attention, highlighting the legal responsibilities of public figures during events that attract large crowds. The case underscores the importance of adhering to legal protocols to ensure public safety and the potential legal consequences of negligence.

Conclusion

The arrest of Allu Arjun serves as a significant case study in understanding the intricacies of arrest and detention within India’s evolving legal landscape. It underscores the critical importance of public safety measures during large events and the legal obligations of individuals and organizations to prevent negligence leading to tragic outcomes. As India’s criminal justice system undergoes substantial reforms, this incident reflects the ongoing efforts to balance individual rights with public safety, ensuring that justice is both served and perceived to be served.

The Supreme Court recently clarified the rights of parties in arbitration proceedings. In the case of Dani Wooltex Corporation & Ors v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Another, the Court ruled that an arbitrator cannot simply halt proceedings because a party fails to appear for a hearing after filing a claim.

The case stemmed from a real estate development agreement between Dani Wooltex and Sheil Properties. Dani Wooltex also entered a separate agreement with Marico Industries for another portion of the land. This led to a dispute, with both Sheil and Marico filing lawsuits against Dani Wooltex.

An arbitrator was appointed to handle the claims. Marico’s claim was heard and resolved with an award. However, Sheil’s claim remained inactive for eight years. Dani Wooltex argued that Sheil’s inaction constituted an abandonment of the claim and requested the arbitrator to dismiss it.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the power granted under Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can only be used if continuing the proceedings becomes truly unnecessary or impossible.

The Court stressed that arbitrators must have clear justification based on evidence to terminate proceedings under this section. Simply exercising this power casually would undermine the purpose of the Act, which aims to resolve disputes efficiently.

The Court acknowledged that a claimant abandoning their claim could be a reason to deem proceedings unnecessary. However, abandonment needs to be proven. It can be expressed (clearly stated) or implied, but cannot be easily inferred.

The Court’s key finding was that a claimant’s failure to request a hearing date after filing their claim does not automatically equate to abandonment. This clarifies that claimants have some leeway in managing their participation in arbitration proceedings.

This ruling protects claimants’ rights and ensures that arbitration remains a viable option for resolving disputes, even if there are delays in pursuing claims.

The recent Porsche accident in Pune accident that claimed the lives of two young IT professionals, Aneesh Awadhiya and Ashwini Koshta, has sparked outrage and renewed scrutiny of loopholes in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act).

Initial Bail Granted, Public outcry Erupts

A 17-year-old boy, allegedly driving the Porsche at a high speed while intoxicated, was initially granted bail by the Juvenile Justice Board (JJ Board) on a surety of Rs. 7,500. This decision caused a public outcry, with many questioning the leniency shown towards the minor accused, especially considering the severity of the charges.

JJ Act and Bail Provisions

The JJ Act prioritizes rehabilitation for juveniles in conflict with the law. Bail applications under the Act are decided differently from regular courts. Here’s where potential loopholes come into play:

• Presumption of Bail: The JJ Act emphasizes that a juvenile should be released on bail unless there are strong reasons to believe they might abscond or interfere with the investigation.
• Focus on Rehabilitation: The emphasis is on reforming the juvenile, and detention is seen as a last resort.

Loopholes and Calls for Reform

Critics argue that these provisions can be misused in serious cases. The following are some potential loopholes highlighted in the Pune incident:

• Vague Criteria for Bail Denial: The Act doesn’t clearly define what constitutes “strong reasons” to deny bail, potentially leading to inconsistent application.
• Severity of Crime Not Given Due Weight: The JJ Act’s focus on rehabilitation might not adequately consider the gravity of the offense, particularly in cases with fatalities.

Bail Cancelled, Investigation Continues

Following public pressure and concerns about witness tampering, the JJ Board revoked the minor’s bail and remanded him to an observation home until June 5th. The investigation into the pune accident is ongoing, with police looking into the involvement of pubs that allegedly served alcohol to the minor and the boy’s claim that his driver was behind the wheel.

This tragic incident has reignited discussions about potential reforms to the JJ Act to ensure a more balanced approach that prioritizes both rehabilitation and accountability for serious crimes involving juveniles.

Stalking Laws in India, enshrined in Section 354D of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), have been a very debatable topic. Recently, the Supreme Court made a significant decision by quashing the conviction of a man accused of stalking and criminal intimidation. The basis for this decision was his marriage to the complainant during the appeal process. This case raises critical questions about the interplay between personal relationships and legal proceedings in stalking cases. It emphasizes the need to consider evolving circumstances, such as marriage, while upholding the intent and effectiveness of anti-stalking legislation in India

Background of Dasari Srikanth v. State of Telangana Case

• The appellant faced charges related to sexual harassment under Sections 11 and 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act), as well as under Sections 354D and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
• The trial court acquitted him of the POCSO Act offences but convicted him for other charges in April 2021.
• In June 2023, the High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to three months imprisonment each for the offences under Section 354D and 506 IPC.
• During the appeal before the Supreme Court, the appellant and the victim got married in August 2023.
• Considering this development, the Supreme Court invoked special powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and quashed the convictions, recognizing the impact on their matrimonial life.

Court’s Observations

• Justices BR Gavai and Sandeep Mehta noted that the offences under Section 354D IPC and Section 506 IPC are personal to the complainant and the accused-appellant.
• The fact that they married during the appeal suggests an existing relationship, even when the alleged offences occurred.

Understanding Stalking

• Stalking involves persistent following or attempting to communicate privately with someone, causing fear or distress.
• Under IPC, stalking refers to deliberately and persistently following or contacting another person without their consent, intending to cause fear or discomfort.

Stalking in IPC (Indian Penal Code)

• Section 354D IPC defines stalking and outlines actions that constitute stalking:
  • Following a woman in person, trailing her, or closely monitoring her activities.
  • Repeatedly trying to establish contact with the woman through phone calls, messages, or other communication.
• The legal provision acknowledges exceptions, such as pursuing stalking for crime prevention or complying with legal requirements.

New Legal Provision

• Section 77(1) of The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) specifically addresses stalking.

Conclusion

The Dasari Srikanth case highlights the complexities of applying stalking laws in situations where the relationship between the accused and the victim changes during legal proceedings. While the Supreme Court’s decision to quash the conviction due to the subsequent marriage acknowledges the evolving nature of personal relationships, it raises concerns about the potential for misuse and the need for clear guidelines.

In a recent ruling, the Jharkhand High Court has emphasised that for the presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to be invoked, the prosecution must provide evidence that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry shortly before her unnatural death in her matrimonial home.

The case in question, Raja Ram Mandal vs The State of Jharkhand, saw criminal appeals filed against a conviction and sentence handed down by the Additional Sessions Judge-VII, Dhanbad. The appellants were found guilty under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to a decade of rigorous imprisonment.

The prosecution’s argument revolved around the marriage of the informant’s sister to Raja Ram Mandal about four years ago. Allegedly, the sister faced cruelty from her husband and in-laws due to unmet dowry demands within six months of the marriage. On May 2, 2009, the informant was notified of his sister’s death at her in-laws’ home, sparking allegations that she was murdered over a dowry dispute.

The accused were charged under Section 304B of the IPC, and the Trial Court found them guilty. However, the appellants filed Criminal Appeals, arguing that the conviction and sentence were not based on a proper evaluation of the evidence.

The High Court underscored Section 304B IPC, stating that the prosecution must establish five key elements: the cause of death, the timing of death in relation to the marriage, the cruelty or harassment faced by the deceased from her husband or his relatives, the link between such abuse and dowry demands, and the occurrence of this abuse shortly before her death.

The division bench, consisting of Justices Subhash Chand and Ananda Sen, noted that a combined reading of Section 304B of the IPC and Section 113B of the IEA indicates that there must be evidence showing that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry shortly before her death.
The court stated that the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the IEA cannot be invoked as the prosecution failed to prove from the evidence that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demands shortly before her unnatural death in her matrimonial home within seven years of marriage.

The bench added that the Trial Court had erroneously raised the presumption against the appellant convict without providing its finding regarding the commission of the offence under Section 304B of the IPC.

The Court observed that there was no evidence of any dowry harassment by the convicted appellants. While the death of the deceased on May 2, 2009, was indeed unnatural, the prosecution did not present evidence linking this unnatural death to any dowry harassment.

The Court concluded that the prosecution did not adequately prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction and sentence handed down by the Trial Court were found to be based on flawed findings, necessitating intervention, and as a result, both Criminal Appeals were deemed worthy of allowance.

The law presumes a woman’s death within seven years of marriage, where there’s evidence of dowry-related cruelty or harassment shortly before her death, as a “dowry death”. The burden of proof shifts to the accused to demonstrate that the death wasn’t related to dowry demands or harassment. This presumption, established under Section 113B of the IEA and Section 304B of the IPC, applies to deaths occurring within seven years of marriage. The objective of this legal provision is to address the challenges of proving dowry-related crimes, which often occur within the family and are difficult to prosecute. By creating a legal presumption, the law aims to provide better protection to women and deter perpetrators from engaging in dowry-related violence.

In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court has nullified the arrest of Prabir Purkayastha, the founder-editor of Newsclick, in a terrorism-related case. The apex court ordered his immediate release, citing the Delhi Police’s failure to inform him of the reasons for his arrest prior to his detention. Purkayastha was taken into custody around 6:30 am by the Special Cell of the Delhi Police. The police alleged that Newsclick had received funds for promoting pro-China propaganda, leading to the invocation of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The First Information Report (FIR) listed grave charges under various sections of the UAPA and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), including unlawful activities, terrorist acts, raising funds for terrorist activities, conspiracy, promoting enmity between different groups, and criminal conspiracy. Purkayastha was brought for his remand hearing at 6:30 am without any prior notice. His lawyers were informed about the proceedings only after 7 am, following his insistence. The remand application sent to his lawyers via WhatsApp was unsigned and lacked crucial details such as the time and grounds of arrest. Despite objections filed before 8 am, Purkayastha’s lawyers were informed that the remand order had already been granted, allowing seven days of police custody. Notably, official records indicate that the remand order was signed at 6 am, prior to Purkayastha’s appearance before the judge or notification to his lawyers. The FIR was made public several days after Purkayastha’s arrest. Purkayastha’s primary argument was that his arrest was illegal and not in accordance with due process under the Indian Constitution. Article 22(1) of the Constitution states, “No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.” In Purkayastha’s case, he was brought for his remand hearing at 6:30 am without advance notice. Only after his insistence, his lawyers were informed about the proceedings after 7 am. The remand application sent to his lawyers via WhatsApp was incomplete, lacking essential details such as the time and reasons for arrest. Article 22 of the Indian Constitution provides certain safeguards to individuals who are arrested or detained. Article 22(1) states that no person can be arrested or detained without being informed of the grounds for such arrest or detention, except under certain circumstances specified in Article 22(2). Anyone arrested must be informed, as soon as possible, of the grounds for their arrest and allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of their choice. In a recent case, the Supreme Court observed that “the mode of conveying information of the grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve the intended purpose.” It was held that the arrestee must be informed of the grounds for his arrest in writing “as a matter of course and without exception”. The Supreme Court in the case of Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994) laid down the following requirements for effective enforcement of fundamental rights: An arrested person being held in custody is entitled, if he so requests, to have one friend, relative or other person who is known to him or likely to take an interest in his welfare told as far as is practicable that he has been arrested and where he is being detained. The police officer shall inform the arrested person when he is brought to the police station of this right. An entry shall be required to be made in the diary as to who was informed of the arrest. These protections from power must be held to flow from Articles 21 and 22(1) and enforced strictly.

In a recent ruling, the Delhi High Court has stated that a convict is not eligible for parole for the purpose of procreation or to maintain conjugal relationships with his live-in partner, especially when he already has a legally wedded wife and children from that marriage.

This observation was made in the case of Sonu Sonkar v. The Lt Governor, Delhi & Ors. The petitioner, Sonu Sonkar, currently incarcerated in Tihar Jail, Delhi, was convicted under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) by a judgment dated 15th November 2011. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000. Sonkar has been in judicial custody for approximately 16 years and 10 months, excluding a remission of about 2 years and 9 months.

Sonkar married Ms. T on 10th January 2021, but has been unable to consummate the marriage due to his incarceration. Ms. T applied for Sonkar’s release on parole on this ground before the jail authorities on 2nd January 2024. However, the respondent rejected the application on 5th March 2024.

Subsequently, Sonkar filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court to overturn the order dated 5th March 2024. The respondent argued that the petition was based on false and frivolous grounds, as Ms. T is not Sonkar’s wife. According to the Status Report, Sonkar is already married to Ms. A and has three children with her.

The High Court, dismissing the petition, did not find it a suitable case for granting parole. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma noted that a convict is not entitled to parole for procreation or maintaining conjugal relationships with a live-in partner when he already has a legally wedded wife and children from that marriage. The court also observed that granting parole on these grounds would set a harmful precedent.

The court further stated that neither Indian law nor the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018 permit the grant of parole for maintaining conjugal relationships, especially with live-in partners.

In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court declared that legal services provided by lawyers would not be covered under the Consumer Protection Act, emphasizing the unique nature of the legal profession. The verdict, delivered by a Bench comprising of Justices Bela M Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal, underscores that the advocate-client relationship entails distinct attributes, with the client holding direct control over the advocate’s actions.

The Court emphasized the autonomy of clients in directing advocates and highlighted that advocates must not make concessions without explicit instructions. Consequently, the Court concluded that legal services fall outside the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, reinforcing the view that contracts for personal services are excluded from the Act’s definition of ‘services’.

Furthermore, the Court indicated a need to revisit its 1996 decision in Indian Medical Association v. Shanta, which had brought medical professionals under the ambit of the Consumer Protection Act. This decision, the Court noted, may require reconsideration in light of the unique characteristics of the legal profession.

The issue concerning the applicability of the Consumer Protection Act to legal services originated from a 2007 ruling of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, which had held such services as within the Act’s scope. However, the Supreme Court had stayed this ruling in April 2009.

The appellants in this case, the Bar of Indian Lawyers, were represented by Senior Advocate Narender Hooda and Advocate Jasbir Malik, with Senior Advocate V Giri serving as the Amicus Curiae.

During the hearings, the Bench raised pertinent questions regarding the adjudication of deficiencies in legal services and the accountability of lawyers. It also compared the legal profession with the medical profession, questioning why lawyers should not be subject to the same regulations as medical professionals under the Consumer Protection Act.

The Court’s ruling not only exempts legal services from consumer protection laws but also calls for a reevaluation of the legal framework surrounding professional conduct and accountability in the legal profession.

In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court of India clarified that the mere issuance of a marriage certificate, without the performance of the necessary ceremonies, does not validate a Hindu marriage. This observation was made in the case of Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal.

The apex court underscored the importance of both registration and solemnization in a marriage. The case in question involved a couple who married on March 7, 2021, and claimed to have solemnized their marriage on July 7, 2021. They obtained a “marriage certificate,” but the marriage ceremony, as per Hindu rites and customs, was scheduled for October 25, 2022, which did not occur. The respondent filed a divorce petition, leading the court to declare their July 7, 2021, marriage invalid under the law, rendering the issued marriage certificates null and void. The parties confessed that they had not solemnized the marriage according to customs, rites, and rituals and had obtained the certificates due to certain exigencies and pressures. In India, the solemnization of a marriage involves conducting an official ceremony with appropriate rituals. The country’s marriage laws are diverse, including personal laws specific to various religions and the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (SMA). A Hindu marriage is solemnized through Kanyadaan and Saptapadi (seven vows). For Christians, a church ceremony based on local customs validates a marriage. Under Muslim law, a valid marriage requires the consent of both parties, vocal consent, and the signing of a nikahnama. The SMA provides a secular alternative, allowing individuals of different faiths or those opting out of religious traditions to marry through a civil procedure. According to Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA), a valid marriage requires neither party to have a living spouse at the time of the marriage. Neither party should be incapable of giving valid consent due to unsoundness of mind, mental disorder, or recurrent attacks of insanity. The bridegroom must be at least 21 years old, and the bride must be at least 18 years old. The parties should not be within the degrees of prohibited relationship or sapinda of each other, unless permitted by the custom or usage governing each of them. Section 7 of the HMA states that a Hindu marriage becomes valid if it is performed between a Hindu couple according to the customary ceremony and rituals of either party. A Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party. If such rites and ceremonies include the Saptapadi, the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken. The Act acknowledges the differences in the community’s customs, allowing for marriages to be solemnized as per these customs.

In a recent development, the Supreme Court has taken a firm stand against misleading advertising. This move was prompted by a case involving deceptive advertisements disseminated by Patanjali Ayurved. As an immediate measure, the court has ordered advertisers to comply with the Cable TV Network Regulations Rules of 1994 by submitting self-declarations.

The Supreme Court has issued guidelines to curb the menace of misleading advertisements. The court recognised the profound influence of endorsements by celebrities, influencers, and public figures in product marketing. Given this influence, the court stressed the urgent need for these individuals to demonstrate caution and responsibility when endorsing products in advertising campaigns.

As a temporary solution to the problem of misleading advertisements, the court has mandated that advertisers submit a self-declaration in line with the Cable Television Network Rules of 1994 before any advertisement is allowed.

Furthermore, the court has directed the Ministry to create a separate online platform for the submission of self-declarations specifically for press and print media. This platform is to be established within a four-week timeframe. Once the platform is up and running, advertisers will be required to submit their self-declarations prior to publishing any advertisements in print media.

Misleading advertisements are promotional messages or campaigns that present false or deceptive information, causing consumers to make decisions based on incorrect or incomplete information. These can include untrue claims about a product’s features, benefits, or effectiveness, as well as deceptive pricing, warranties, or endorsements.

In many countries, including India, there are laws and regulations designed to prevent and penalize misleading advertising. These laws aim to safeguard consumers and foster fair competition in the marketplace. The recent directive from the Supreme Court is a significant step in this direction. It underscores the court’s commitment to consumer protection and fair business practices.

In a recent development, the Delhi High Court has granted bail to an individual who was accused of supporting the Islamic State (IS). The individual was charged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), an anti-terror law. The court clarified that the accused’s interest in the banned terrorist organization did not equate to direct involvement.

The case in question is Ammar Abdul Rahiman v. National Investigation Agency. Rahiman was arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in August 2021 and was charged under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the UAPA. The NIA alleged that Rahiman’s mobile phone contained downloaded videos related to ISIS and brutal killings, along with photographs promoting terrorism and ISIS flags, which they claimed established his radical mindset and association with ISIS.

However, the Delhi High Court granted Rahiman bail, stating that the mere presence of downloaded material on his mobile device should not lead to adverse inference. The court further emphasized that Rahiman seemed to have only downloaded and stored these contents, with no evidence of attempts to share, broadcast, or transmit them to others.

India has various laws and Acts to combat terrorism. The UAPA, enacted in 1967, allows law enforcement agencies to act against individuals and organizations engaged in unlawful activities, including terrorism. Other laws include the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA), the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA), the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, and the Anti-Hijacking Act, 2016.

The UAPA was amended in 2004 and 2008 to model it as an anti-terror law. In August 2019, Parliament cleared the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill, 2019, to designate individuals as terrorists on certain grounds provided in the Act. The UAPA deviates from ordinary legal procedures, creating an exceptional regime where the constitutional safeguards of the accused are curtailed.

It empowers the NIA to investigate and prosecute cases under the UAPA across the country, provides for the death penalty and life imprisonment for terrorist acts, allows for the detention of suspects without charge or trial for up to 180 days, and denies bail to the accused unless the court is satisfied that they are not guilty. It defines terrorism as any act that causes or intends to cause death or injury to any person, or damage or destruction to any property, or that threatens the unity, security, or economic stability of India or any other country.

The Bombay High Court has upheld a lower court’s decision directing a woman to pay monthly maintenance of Rs 10,000 to her unemployed husband who also suffers from medical ailments. The woman stated that she had resigned from the bank where she had been working as a branch manager.

The woman had attached a resignation letter from 2019 to support her claim of being unemployed, despite which the court upheld the order.

The lower court had held that the woman was paying a home loan and also looking after the expenses of their minor child. “It is necessary for her to disclose the source from which the expenses were being met. It is therefore clear that even after resignation from the bank, she was earning and had a source of income,” the lower court in Kalyan had stated.

The husband had filed for divorce in 2016. Both of them filed applications seeking interim maintenance from each other. While the lower court dismissed the application of the woman, it allowed the application of the husband directing his wife to pay him Rs 10,000 as he submitted that she was earning about Rs 65,000 a month at the bank. The wife challenged the order in the High Court.

In the high court, Justice Sharmila Deshmukh noted that the woman’s advocate did not dispute that as of today the woman is earning. The bench noted that even in trial court, the woman did not file any documentary evidence in respect of her income. “If it was the contention of the wife that she had the liability for payment of certain expenses, it was necessary for her to place the same on record so that the trial court could have assessed the quantum of maintenance which is to be granted to the husband,” noted Justice Deshmukh.

The bench further added that at the stage of grant of interim maintenance in the absence of any material, a certain element of guesswork is involved and considering the income of the parties, the trial court ascertains the quantum of maintenance.

The bench lastly said that “Even if it is taken that the wife has certain expenses to be met, it was incumbent upon her to place the necessary material before the trial court so that it would have been in position to assess the quantum of maintenance to be granted. Unfortunately, the same has not been done in this case

In a recent groundbreaking judgement, the Calcutta High Court has ruled in the case of Sudarsan Mandal and Another v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., that for In-Vitro Fertilization (IVF) procedures, the sperm or the oocyte doesn’t need to originate from the couple undergoing the treatment.

The case was brought before the court by a husband and wife who wished to conceive through IVF after tragically losing their teenage daughter. The couple encountered obstacles due to the husband’s age of 59 years, which exceeded the age limit for IVF as per the Act, while the wife, at 46 years, was within the permissible age. The court ruled that although the husband was too old to donate his gametes, the wife was still eligible under the Act, and there was no prohibition on her seeking IVF treatment. Consequently, the High Court granted the couple’s request for IVF treatment.

Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharya of the single bench observed that the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021 defines a commissioning couple, eligible for IVF facilities, as a married couple unable to conceive naturally. The court further ruled that even if the husband could not contribute to the IVF process, the couple could still conceive using donor gametes. The Act does not stipulate that either the sperm or the oocyte must necessarily come from the couple.

The Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021, provides a framework for implementing surrogacy laws by establishing the National Assisted Reproductive Technology and Surrogacy Board. The Act’s objective is to regulate and supervise ART clinics and banks, prevent misuse, and ensure the safe and ethical practice of ART services.

ART services, as defined by the Act, encompass all techniques aimed at achieving pregnancy by handling the sperm or the oocyte outside the human body and transferring the gamete or embryo into a woman’s reproductive system. This includes gamete donation, in vitro fertilization, and gestational surrogacy.

A child born through ART will be considered the biological child of the commissioning couple and will have the same rights and privileges as a natural child of the couple. The donor will not have any parental rights over the child.

As per Section 21(g) of the Act, ART services can be applied to a woman aged between twenty-one and fifty years and a man aged between twenty-one and fifty-five years. This landmark ruling has significant implications for couples seeking IVF treatment and contributes to the evolving discourse on reproductive rights.

In the case of Pasru @ Ismail v. The State, the Allahabad High Court acquitted the appellant who had been convicted of rape in 1986. Justice Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan presided over the bench and noted inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony suggesting she may have been a willing participant. With unreliable testimony and little significance in forensic evidence, the Court found the conviction erroneous emphasizing the need for reliable evidence in such cases. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted of charges under section 376 IPC highlighting the importance of ensuring fairness and accuracy in legal proceedings.

CASE DETAILS:

Pasru @ Ismail v. The State

Criminal Appeal No. – 158 of 1986

Allahabad High Court

Coram: Justice Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan

BACKGROUND:

• The alleged victim/prosecutrix filed an FIR on 22.01.1984 stating that the appellant and co-accused forcibly abducted her along with another associate and all four individuals raped her until 10 p.m.
• She claimed they threatened her and tied a cloth over her mouth.
• Two of the accused were known to her while the other two were unknown.
• After her release, she went to the police station with her husband to file the FIR.
• During the investigation, semen stains were found on the appellant’s underwear but he claimed it was forced on him by police personnel.
• No injuries were found on the alleged victim during her medical examination and no sperm was detected in vaginal smear samples.
• The trial court convicted the appellant based on the evidence while the other two accused were acquitted.
• The appellant and co-accused appealed the conviction but the co-accused passed away during the appeal process.
• In the High Court, the appellant’s counsel argued that the alleged victim’s husband was not an eyewitness and the other prosecution witnesses had turned hostile weakening the case against the appellant.

OBSERVATIONS:

Considering the case’s details and the trial court’s ruling, the Court observed that the prosecution’s argument relied heavily on the victim/prosecutrix’s testimony as all alleged eyewitnesses had turned hostile. The Court highlighted several inconsistencies in her statements during the trial and cross-examination. Reviewing her testimony, it seemed possible that she had accompanied the accused willingly, the Court remarked.

Based on this assessment, the Court emphasized that given the appearance of the victim/prosecutrix as a willing participant, the forensic lab’s report on seminal stains found on the appellant and the victim/prosecutrix’s inner garments held little significance. Consequently, deeming the testimony unreliable, the Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused of the charges under section 376 IPC.

JUDGEMENT:

The Allahabad High Court acquitted a man who had been convicted by the trial court in 1986 for raping an alleged minor girl in January 1984 sentencing him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. Justice Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan presiding over the bench noted that the trial court had erred in accepting the unreliable testimony of the alleged victim/prosecutrix which led to a clear case of patent illegality.

In the case of Pbsamp Projects Pvt Ltd v. HLV Limited, the Telangana High Court emphasized the importance of clarity and thoroughness in judicial orders especially in complex matters like arbitration disputes. The Court overturned the decision of the executing court due to deficiencies in reasoning and explanation reaffirming the principle that judicial decisions must be well-reasoned for fairness and justice.

The Court’s reference to relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act and precedent-setting Supreme Court judgments demonstrated meticulous legal analysis. By remitting the matter to the Executing Court for reconsideration, the High Court underscored the significance of procedural fairness and adherence to legal principles ensuring justice for all parties involved.

CASE DETAILS:

Pbsamp Projects Pvt Ltd v. HLV Limited

Civil Revision Petition No.60 of 2024

Telangana High Court

Coram: Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Anil Kumar Jukanti

BACKGROUND:

• In response to the Petitioner’s argument, the Respondent contended that the executing Court’s interpretation was accurate as the term “sum” in Section 31(7) of the Arbitration Act does not encompass “interest.”
• Additionally, the Respondent asserted that the amount already paid by them totalling Rs. 44,42,05,254.00 completely satisfied the award thereby dismissing the need for further payment of compound interest.
• The Telangana High Court upon reviewing the arguments presented by both parties will likely consider the language and intent of Section 31(7) of the Arbitration Act to determine whether the term “sum” encompasses interest.
• Additionally, the Court may assess whether the executing Court accurately calculated the amount due under the final award.
• The outcome of the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution will hinge on the Court’s interpretation of relevant legal provisions and its determination of whether the executing Court’s decision was erroneous.
• If the High Court finds merit in the Petitioner’s arguments and concludes that the executing Court misinterpreted the law or made errors in calculation, it may overturn the lower court’s decision and grant relief to the Petitioner.
• Conversely, if the High Court upholds the executing Court’s decision, the Petitioner’s application for enforcement of the arbitral award with compound interest may be dismissed.

OBSERVATIONS:

The High Court’s decision underscores the critical importance of clarity and thoroughness in judicial orders especially in matters involving complex legal interpretations and calculations. By setting aside the executing Court’s order due to deficiencies in reasoning and explanation, the High Court reaffirmed the principle that judicial decisions must be well-reasoned and articulate to ensure fairness and justice.

Furthermore, the High Court’s reference to relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act and precedent-setting Supreme Court judgments demonstrates the meticulous legal analysis undertaken in resolving the dispute. The court’s reliance on the interpretation of Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration Act as elucidated by the Supreme Court in previous cases provides valuable guidance for interpreting similar legal provisions in future disputes.

Overall, the High Court’s decision to remit the matter to the Executing Court for reconsideration underscores the importance of procedural fairness and adherence to legal principles in resolving disputes ultimately ensuring justice for all parties involved.

JUDGEMENT:

The division bench of Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Anil Kumar Jukanti of the Telangana High Court overturned a decision made by the executing court criticizing it for being vague and lacking in explanation or reasoning. They emphasized that given the nature of the dispute concerning the calculation of the amount owed under the arbitral award, the executing court should have issued a thorough and reasoned decision.

In a recent landmark judgement, the Supreme Court of India has reiterated that a woman’s stridhan is her absolute property. The ruling came in the case of Maya Gopinathan v. Anoop S.B., where it was stated that a husband does not have control over his wife’s stridhan, although he may use it during times of hardship.

The case in question revolves around a marriage that took place on May 4, 2003, following Hindu customs and rituals. The appellant, Maya Gopinathan, claimed that she received 89 sovereigns of gold from her family as a wedding gift. Furthermore, her father gave the first respondent, Anoop S.B., a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- after the wedding.

The appellant alleged that Anoop took possession of all her jewellery and entrusted it to the second respondent for safekeeping. She further claimed that the respondents misused her jewellery to settle their pre-existing financial obligations.

In 2009, Maya filed a petition in the Family Court seeking recovery of her jewellery’s value and the amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-. She also petitioned for the dissolution of her marriage. The Family Court ruled in her favour, stating that the respondents had indeed misappropriated her gold jewellery and that she was entitled to recover the loss caused by this misappropriation.

However, the respondents appealed against the Family Court’s order in the Kerala High Court. The High Court partially allowed the respondents’ appeal and overturned the relief granted to Maya by the Family Court. Following this, Maya appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court’s final judgement. The Supreme Court ruled in her favour.

The Supreme Court bench, comprising Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta, observed that stridhan is a woman’s absolute property. While a husband has no control over it, he can use it in times of distress. However, he is morally obligated to return it or its value to his wife.

The court referred to the judgement in the case of Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997), where it was held that stridhan does not become joint property of the wife and husband. The husband has no title or independent dominion over the property.

Stridhan, derived from the words ‘Stri’ meaning woman and ‘dhana’ meaning property, is whatever a woman receives during her lifetime. It includes all movable, immovable property, gifts etc., received by a woman before marriage, at the time of marriage, during childbirth, and widowhood. Stridhan is different from dowry as it is a voluntary gift given to a woman before or after her marriage without any coercion. Women have an absolute right over their Stridhan.

The law protects a woman’s right to her Stridhan under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 read with Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Even if it is in the custody of her husband or in-laws, they are considered trustees and are obligated to return it when demanded by her. Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 also provides for a woman’s right to her Stridhan in cases where she is a victim of domestic violence.

In 2017, the world was shaken by revelations published in The New York Times detailing allegations of sexual harassment and abuse against film producer Harvey Weinstein. This exposé sparked the global #MeToo movement, leading to Weinstein’s conviction in New York for sexually assaulting a production assistant in 2006 and raping an aspiring actress in 2013. However, a recent ruling by the New York Court of Appeals has overturned Weinstein’s 2020 conviction, citing procedural errors and the controversial inclusion of “Molineux Witnesses”.

Weinstein’s Case: A Timeline

The saga began in October 2017 when numerous women bravely stepped forward to accuse Weinstein of rape, sexual assault, and sexual abuse, as documented by The New York Times and The New Yorker. Following charges of rape and criminal sexual act, Weinstein turned himself in to the police in May 2018.

In February 2020, Weinstein was convicted of third-degree rape and first-degree criminal sexual act, leading to a 23-year prison sentence. In February 2023, a Los Angeles judge added another 16 years to Weinstein’s sentence for a separate conviction of rape and sexual assault, to be served consecutively after his New York sentence.

The 2024 Verdict: A Turning Point

On April 25, 2024, the New York State Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, made a landmark decision, overturning Weinstein’s conviction on sex crimes. The court, in a 4-3 vote, ruled that Weinstein’s trial was unfair.

One key issue was the trial judge’s decision to allow testimony from women whose allegations were not directly related to the charges against Weinstein. As a result, the court ordered a new trial. Judge Jenny Rivera, representing the majority of the appeals court, stressed that the inclusion of testimony about uncharged sexual acts from individuals not involved in the initial accusations served no legitimate purpose and could potentially bias the jury.

Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals found it necessary to order a new trial due to prejudicial decisions made in the previous proceedings. Central to the case were the testimonies of women known as “Molineux witnesses” or “prior bad act witnesses,” who provided the main evidence against Weinstein.

Understanding Molineux Witnesses

The term “Molineux Witnesses” originates from the New York Court of Appeals’ legal proceedings in People v. Molineux (1991). This principle allows prosecutors to introduce evidence of a defendant’s past misconduct or crimes to demonstrate various factors such as motive, opportunity, intent, common scheme, plan, knowledge, or the absence of mistake or identity. A Molineux witness is someone who can testify about the defendant’s past criminal actions that have not resulted in formal charges.

In a recent landmark decision, the Karnataka High Court has upheld the state’s ban on hookahs, marking a significant stride towards public health. The ruling was made in the case of R Bharath and others versus the State of Karnataka (2024).

The case emerged when a group of restaurant owners challenged the state government’s notification that imposed a ban on the sale of hookahs in public places. These establishments, which operated as hookah bars, argued against the ban, citing Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom to practice any profession or trade.

The High Court, however, based its judgment on constitutional provisions, particularly Article 47 and Article 19(1)(g). The court underscored that these rights are not absolute and can be subject to reasonable restrictions, especially when public welfare is at stake.

Article 47 of the Constitution of India, 1950, mandates the State to elevate the level of nutrition and living standards and to enhance public health. It emphasizes the State’s duty to prohibit the consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs detrimental to health, except for medicinal purposes.

The State List of the Constitution of India, 1950, also includes relevant entries. Entry No. 6 pertains to public health and sanitation, including hospitals and dispensaries. Entry No. 8 refers to intoxicating liquors, encompassing their production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase, and sale.

The court’s verdict also extended to the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act (COTPA), 2003. After examining the provisions of COTPA and its associated rules, the court concluded that providing hookah services falls under the category of prohibited activities. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to reduce tobacco consumption.

The court further clarified the term ‘service’ under COTPA regulations. It drew a distinction between the passive act of smoking in designated areas and the active provision of hookah services. The court also underscored the inherent human intervention involved in preparing and serving hookah, likening it to other hospitality services.

The implications of the Karnataka High Court’s verdict on the hookah ban are far-reaching. The ruling sets a precedent for the rigorous enforcement of anti-tobacco laws, prioritizing public health over commercial interests. By affirming the state’s authority to regulate hookah bars and similar establishments, the court has initiated proactive measures to combat substance abuse and safeguard the well-being of citizens.